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COHABITATION WORLDWIDE TODAY 
By Margaret Ryznar* & Anna Stępień-Sporek** 
ABSTRACT 
Despite the increase in cohabitation around the world, legal 
responses to it remain limited, particularly in the last several years. 
Yet, there are universal issues at the end of a cohabitation, 
particularly related to property division. This article will survey the 
recent legal developments on the property consequences of 
cohabitation in both the United States and Poland, drawing on 
comparative lessons to suggest future developments in this area of 
law. 
INTRODUCTION 
Around the world, cohabitation has been on the rise for decades 
with many millions of couples living together outside of marriage.1 
                                                                                                                 
* Professor of Law, Indiana University McKinney School of Law. The authors would like to thank 
Jessica Dickinson and Ben Keele for excellent research assistance. 
** Attorney-at-law, partner at Stępień-Sporek, Pawelski, Stoppa Spółka Partnerska Kancelaria Radców 
Prawnych I Adwokatów. 
 1. Patrick Parkinson, Can Marriage Survive Secularization?, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1749, 1753–54 
(2016). The author states as follows: 
Legal marriage, which was once the only accepted context for sexual relations and the nurture of 
children in western countries, has long ceased to be central to people’s sexual or reproductive lives in 
many parts of the world. 
Marriage remains the most common form of couple relationship within Western 
and Northern Europe, but the gap between marriage and cohabitation as a family 
form is narrowing. For example, figures from 2006 show that in France, twenty-
six percent of adults in the eighteen to forty-nine age range were cohabiting, 
while thirty-nine percent were married. In Sweden, twenty-five percent were 
cohabiting and thirty-seven percent were married. In the United Kingdom, in 
2001, twenty-two percent of adults aged between twenty and thirty-four were 
cohabiting, while thirty-two percent were married. 
In the United States, marriage is increasingly stratified by reference to 
educational level. The percentage of adults aged twenty-five to sixty with four 
years of high school education but no college education, and who were in first 
marriages, fell from seventy-three percent in the 1970s to forty-five percent in 
the 2000s. There was also a twenty-eight percent decline in first marriages 
among the least educated adults over this same time period. While rates of 
marriage have declined for people of all educational levels, the rate of decline 
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The United States is no exception: single people recently 
outnumbered married people for the first time in history.2 Many 
Americans are cohabitating instead of marrying.3 For example, 
marital households recently comprised less than half of all 
households in the United States, while almost 6% of households were 
opposite-sex, unmarried partners.4 Over 7 million opposite-sex 
couples cohabitated in 2010,5 a dramatic increase from the 523,000 
cohabitating couples in 1970.6 Between 2000 and 2010 alone, there 
was a 41% increase in unmarried couple households.7 Unthinkable 
and even criminal for much of history,8 cohabitation has become a 
transition to marriage or even a substitute for it.9 
In Poland, the trend is similar. According to the European Social 
Survey, cohabitants comprised 4.5% of all unions in 2006, an 
                                                                                                                 
has been least among college-educated people. 
Id. 
 2. See, e.g., REBECCA TRAISTER, ALL THE SINGLE LADIES: UNMARRIED WOMEN AND THE RISE OF 
AN INDEPENDENT NATION 5 (2016). 
 3. Parkinson, supra note 1, at 1753. 
 4. DAPHNE LOFQUIST ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILIES: 2010 5 (2012), 
https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6W8-H5SN]; 
Katharine Silbaugh, Distinguishing Households from Families, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1071, 1074 
(2016) (“We are not a marriage population predominantly in practice, and children are not 
predominantly raised for 18 years by their two parents in a common household.”); see also Tonya L. 
Brito, Complex Kinship Networks in Fragile Families, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2567, 2569 (2017) 
(reviewing the “dramatic changes to the American family that have occurred over the past half 
century”); Jessica R. Feinberg, The Survival of Nonmarital Relationship Statuses in the Same-Sex 
Marriage Era: A Proposal, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 47, 62–63 (2014). 
 5. LOFQUIST ET AL., supra note 4, at 3; see also Anna Stȩpień-Sporek & Margaret Ryznar, The 
Consequences of Cohabitation, 50 U.S.F. L. REV. 75, 77 (2016) [hereinafter Consequences of 
Cohabitation]. 
 6. Katherine C. Gordon, Note, The Necessity and Enforcement of Cohabitation Agreements: When 
Strings Will Attach and How to Prevent Them—A State Survey, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 245, 245 (1998). 
 7. Lawrence W. Waggoner, With Marriage on the Decline and Cohabitation on the Rise, What 
About Marital Rights for Unmarried Partners?, 41 AM. C. TR. & EST. COUNS. L.J. 49, 55 (2015). 
 8. Margaret M. Mahoney, Forces Shaping the Law of Cohabitation for Opposite Sex Couples, 7 
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 135, 141 (2005) (reviewing the historic criminalization of unmarried cohabitation). 
 9. Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, Marry Me, Bill: Should Cohabitation be the (Legal) 
Default Option?, 64 LA. L. REV. 403, 403 (2004) (“[I]ncreasingly cohabitation is being proposed not as 
a testing ground for marriage, but as a functional substitute for it. The trend in family law and 
scholarship in Europe and Canada is to treat married and cohabiting couples similarly, or even 
identically.”); see also id. at 404 (“In [the United States], the American Law Institute [ALI] recently 
proposed that, at least when it comes to the law of dissolution, couples who have been living together 
for a substantial period of time should be treated the same as married couples.”). But cf. Courtney G. 
Joslin, Discrimination In and Out of Marriage, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2018) (noting that cohabitation is 
more common among certain socioeconomic groups in the United States). 
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increase from previous years.10 As outlined by Kathleen Kiernan, the 
official statistics show that cohabitation is still in the first stage of 
diffusion:11 rare and thus treated as an unusual type of relationship.12 
The real data, however, may differ from the official data because 
some people hide their cohabitation for reasons such as societal 
disapproval.13 Indeed, the high number of children born outside of 
marriage suggests that cohabitation is more common.14 
Couples choose to cohabitate instead of marry for various reasons, 
such as insufficient finances,15 avoidance of the cultural and legal 
implications of marriage,16 or simply the lack of desire to get 
married.17 Many cohabitations are temporary because cohabitants 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Anna Matysiak, Is Poland Really ‘Immune’ to the Spread of Cohabitation? 2 (Max Planck Inst. 
for Demographic Research, Working Paper No. 2009-12, 2009), 
https://www.demogr.mpg.de/papers/working/wp-2009-012.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RG9-27ZE]. 
 11. Kathleen Kiernan, Cohabitation in Western Europe: Trends, Issues and Implications, in JUST 
LIVING TOGETHER: IMPLICATIONS OF COHABITATION ON FAMILIES, CHILDREN AND SOCIAL POLICY 3, 4 
(Alan Booth & Ann C. Crouter eds., 2002); see also Monika Mynarska et al., Free to Stay, Free to 
Leave: Insights from Poland into the Meaning of Cohabitation, 31 DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH 1107, 
1113 (2014). 
 12. Monika Mynarska & Anna Matysiak, Diffusion of Cohabitation in Poland 15 (Inst. of Statistics 
and Demography Warsaw Sch. of Econ., Working Paper No. 3, 2010), 
http://kolegia.sgh.waw.pl/pl/KAE/struktura/ISiD/publikacje/Documents/Working_Paper/ISID_WP_3_2
010.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7HN-NJZW]. 
 13. Id. at 11. 
 14. Joanna Stańczak et al., Marriages and Births in Poland, EUROSTAT, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Marriages_and_births_in_Poland 
[https://perma.cc/5S6U-N785] (last visited Sept. 20, 2018). 
 15. Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal Policy: The Case of Heterosexual 
Cohabitation, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 11 (2007). The author states: 
Qualitative research reveals that marriage, although much revered in 
lower-income communities, is seen by many as appropriate only when a couple’s 
economic situation is secure, a situation that may not happen quickly for some 
groups, if ever. Interviews with working- and lower-middle-class cohabitants 
suggest that they believe marriage should not occur until financial stability has 
been reached, including not only the resources for a large wedding but perhaps 
also for home ownership. 
Id.; see also Spencer Rand, The Real Marriage Penalty: How Welfare Law Discourages Marriage 
Despite Public Policy Statements to the Contrary—And What Can Be Done About It, 18 U.D.C. L. REV. 
93, 93 (2015) (“Couples regularly complain about marriage penalties, discovering that the tax 
consequences of marrying make the cost of marriage prohibitive.”). 
 16. Consequences of Cohabitation, supra note 5, at 75. 
 17. Gordon, supra note 6, at 245. 
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often eventually separate or marry.18 According to one study, only 
10% of cohabitants are still cohabitating after five years.19 
For some couples, cohabitation is a transitory step or a testing 
period before marriage. However, the increase in divorces with major 
financial consequences, especially in Poland, may make people 
hesitate before formalizing their relationships.20 In other words, the 
negative consequences associated with divorce may be leading to a 
decrease in marriage.21 
The increase in cohabitation cases has prompted courts to address 
the legal issues related to cohabitation,22 most of which concern 
children and the division of property. Although parents are 
responsible for their children regardless of whether they were ever 
married,23 property division between cohabitants is more gray.24 This 
article analyzes the recent legal developments on the property 
consequences of cohabitation in both the United States and Poland, 
drawing on comparative lessons to suggest future developments in 
this area of law. 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Waggoner, supra note 7, at 64–65. 
 19. Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal Regulation, 42 FAM. 
L.Q. 309, 322 (2008). However, “approximately 60% of all U.S. cohabitants and 70% of those in a first, 
premarital cohabitation marry within five years.” Id. 
 20. Mynarska et al., supra note 11, at 1125. 
 21. Steven K. Berenson, Should Cohabitation Matter in Family Law?, 13 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 289, 
315 (2011) (noting some cohabitants avoid marriage to avoid property consequences). 
 22. Deborah A. Widiss, Intimate Liberties and Antidiscrimination Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 2083, 2119 
(2017). For example: 
As sexual mores around cohabitation and non-marital intimacy changed, 
increasing numbers of (mostly different-sex) unmarried couples sought to rent 
apartments or houses. During the 1980s and 1990s, there were numerous 
lawsuits brought across the country by couples who were refused tenancy by 
landlords who disapproved of their choice to live together without being married. 
Id. 
 23. Doe v. Hancock Cty. Bd. of Health, 436 N.E.2d 791, 793 (Ind. 1982) (“[U]nmarried parents have 
the same obligations and duties to their child as do married parents . . . .”); see also Leslie I. Jennings-
Lax & Louise T. Truax, Co-Parenting Agreements Between Unmarried Cohabitants, 50 FAM. L.Q. 349, 
361 (2016) (discussing parenting agreements between cohabitants). See generally CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, UNMARRIED CHILDBEARING, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/unmarried-
childbearing.htm [https://perma.cc/FRT2-TF69] (last visited Feb. 20, 2017) (noting that in 2016, more 
than 40% of births were to single women). 
 24. See Berenson, supra note 21, at 295. 
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I.   Cohabitation Developments in the United States 
Recently, there have been a few legal developments on 
cohabitation in the United States, but they are best understood within 
the context of the greater framework on cohabitation, which emerged 
in the 1970s through the early cases establishing the two approaches 
to cohabitation contracts, which are the primary ways to protect 
cohabitants. 
The majority approach is that contracts between cohabitants are 
enforceable regarding the terms of their separation.25 Scholars have 
taken this as evidence of the shift from status to contract in family 
law.26 The minority approach does not recognize such contracts.27 
A.   Legal Framework on Cohabitation 
The law on cohabitation has a very short history in the United 
States. Outside of common law marriage, cohabitants had few rights 
until notable case law developed in the 1970s.28 Marvin v. Marvin in 
California established the majority approach on cohabitation in the 
United States.29 
In Marvin, Michelle and Lee lived together for seven years without 
getting married, and Michelle took his last name.30 Michelle alleged 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See infra Part I.A. 
 26. Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 835–36 (2004). 
Scholars describing the current contractualization of family law . . . cite the 
availability of no-fault divorce, the enforceability of prenuptial agreements about 
property distribution, and the enforceability of agreements between nonmarital 
partners . . . . 
 . . . But the status-to-contract story overstates the changes that have 
occurred in family law over time. It obscures the substantial evidence that 
supports a counter-narrative that could be told about family law, but is not: the 
story of the persistence of status rules denying individuals choice about the 
structure of their relationships. 
 Id. 
 27. See infra Part I.A. 
 28. Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. 
REV. 709, 712 (1996) (outlining common law marriage, which is recognized only in a few states today 
and requires capacity, agreement, cohabitation, and holding oneself out as married). Common law 
marriage and religious cohabitation are beyond the scope of this article. 
 29. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 113 (Cal. 1976). 
 30. Id. at 110. 
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that Lee had promised to support her throughout her life in exchange 
for her work as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper, and cook.31 
She argued that because of this oral agreement, she surrendered her 
career as an entertainer to devote herself fulltime to the household.32 
Michelle asserted that this oral contract should be enforced, entitling 
her to support payments and to half the property that the couple had 
acquired during the relationshipincluding motion picture rights 
worth more than $1 millioneven though the property was all in 
Lee’s name.33 
If Michelle had been a wife rather than a cohabitant, she would 
have enjoyed rights to the property acquired during the marriage 
under divorce law.34 At the time Michelle brought her lawsuit, public 
policy aimed to discourage cohabitation by withholding remedies for 
cohabitants.35 
The California trial court in Marvin v. Marvin granted a judgment 
on the pleadings for Lee, resulting in his receipt of all of the couple’s 
property upon the break-up of the relationship.36 The California 
Court of Appeals affirmed in Lee’s favor.37 The California Supreme 
Court, however, reversed in favor of Michelle, holding that a contract 
between unmarried partners should be enforced except to the extent 
that it explicitly rests on the consideration of meretricious sexual 
services.38 
It has long been public policy in the United States to disallow 
payment for sexual services, but in Marvin, the California Supreme 
Court made the distinction between contracts based on domestic 
services and those based on sexual relations.39 The court thus held 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Rebecca Aviel, Family Law and the New Access to Justice, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2279, 2283 
(2018). 
 35. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 112. 
 36. Id. at 110. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Courtney Megan Cahill, Reproduction Reconceived, 101 MINN. L. REV. 617, 694 (2016). 
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that the terms of the contract as alleged by Michelle relied on lawful 
consideration, providing a basis for declaratory relief in her favor.40 
Several earlier decisions from the California courts made a similar 
distinction.41 Marvin followed these decisions, citing the principle 
that cohabitants should be able to contract with one another regarding 
property.42 
Marvin is a watershed case because the California Supreme Court 
concluded that if cohabitants lacked an express contract, the court 
should inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether it 
demonstrated an implied contract, agreement of partnership or joint 
venture, or some other tacit understanding between the parties.43 To 
resolve these types of cases, the Marvin court allowed the use of the 
doctrine of quantum meruit, as well as constructive and resulting 
trusts.44 Given the public policy against cohabitation at the time, the 
Marvin decision was important.45 
To reach its decision, the California Supreme Court in Marvin 
rejected several reasons previously used to deny relief to cohabitants. 
First, the court refused to deny relief as punishment for a nonmarital 
relationship because it necessarily rewards the other party.46 Second, 
the court noted that reasonable expectations and equitable 
considerations can exist outside of marriage.47 Third, the court 
rejected the idea that services provided with no express contract 
would be a gift.48 Finally, the court rejected the notion that an 
equitable distribution of property between nonmarital partners would 
discourage marriage.49 The court noted that, if anything, the 
inequitable distribution that would occur if no implied contract was 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 116. 
 41. Id. at 112. 
 42. Id. at 116. 
 43. Id. at 122. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Deborah Zalesne, The Contractual Family: The Role of the Market in Shaping Family 
Formations and Rights, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1027, 1038–39 n.36 (2015). 
 46. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 121. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 122. 
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recognized would discourage marriage since it would be much to the 
advantage of the property holder to remain unmarried.50 
Family law generally falls within the domain of the states,51 and 
after the Marvin decision, most states followed California’s lead, 
illustrating a shift in cultural attitudes and public policy.52 A minority 
of states decided not to follow Marvin for public policy reasons, with 
Hewitt v. Hewitt notably articulating this view.53 
The Hewitt case from Illinois established the minority approach 
that does not enforce cohabitation contracts. In Hewitt, Victoria and 
Robert Hewitt cohabitated as students in college.54 After moving to 
Illinois, Robert worked in the medical field while Victoria cared for 
their children full-time.55 Victoria also assisted Robert in building his 
medical practice, using her skills and her parents’ financial 
assistance.56 After 15 years of cohabitation, the couple separated and 
Victoria filed for divorce.57 The court dismissed the divorce action 
and held that Victoria was not entitled to any remedies,58 reasoning 
that giving her rights would devalue the institution of marriage59 and 
would essentially revive common law marriage, a doctrine that 
Illinois abolished in 1905.60 
Ultimately, Victoria could not recover her contributions to the 
relationship despite its similarity to marriage.61 Given the Hewitt 
court’s reasoning, a cohabitant could benefit from the other’s 
contributions and leave the relationship with the accumulated wealth. 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. 
 51. Kristin A. Collins, Federalism’s Fallacy: The Early Tradition of Federal Family Law and the 
Invention of States’ Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761, 1764 (2005) (noting that family law is currently 
in the domain of the states, but historically, the federal government was not limited in this way). 
 52. Ann Laquer Estin & J. Thomas Oldham, Introduction, 50 FAM. L.Q. 213, 213 (2016) (“[M]ost 
U.S. states do not treat unmarried cohabitation as a status, and Marvin v. Marvin remains the majority 
view regarding how courts should adjudicate the rights of unmarried partners when a relationship 
ends.”). 
 53. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (Ill. 1979). 
 54. Id. at 1205. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 1205. 
 59. Heweitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1211. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
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The Hewitt decision remains good law in Illinois.62 Illinois has 
denied legal protections to cohabitants in other contexts as well, 
including claims for loss of consortium.63 In sum, the traditional rule 
regarding cohabitation, which now represents the minority approach 
led by Illinois, is that cohabitants do not have any rights between 
themselves.64 
In states like Illinois, where cohabitants remain largely 
unprotected, people have reason to hesitate before making significant 
investments in a nonmarital relationship. Without adequate remedies, 
cohabitants could face financial hardship at the end of the 
relationship.65 For these reasons, Hewitt has been debated and the 
majority approach has instead recognized contractual rights for 
cohabitants.66 
In 2001, the American Law Institute (ALI) proposed a set of rules 
to standardize the states’ approaches to cohabitation in the Principles 
of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations.67 
The ALI drafters proposed that cohabitants, regardless of their 
gender, be treated as partners under certain circumstances.68 The ALI 
defined “domestic partnership” as a new legal family status and 
addressed its dissolution.69 
                                                                                                                 
 62. See, e.g., Ayala v. Fox, 564 N.E.2d 920, 922 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
 63. Medley v. Strong, 558 N.E.2d 244, 248 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
 64. Cynthia Grant Bowman, Legal Treatment of Cohabitation in the United States, 26 LAW & POL’Y 
119, 126, 142 (2004). Indeed, society generally strongly disapproved of sexual relationships outside of 
marriage. See, e.g., Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1210 (rejecting the contract claims between unmarried 
cohabitants due to a public policy disfavoring “private contractual alternatives to marriage”); 
Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316, 324 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (noting Louisiana’s interest in 
discouraging “relationships which serve to erode the cornerstone of society, i.e., the family”). 
 65. Margaret Ryznar, All’s Fair in Love and War: But What About in Divorce? The Fairness of 
Property Division in American and English Big Money Divorce Cases, 86 N.D. L. REV. 115, 130–31 
(2010). Furthermore, cohabitation may discourage marriage because a divorce likely would mean a loss 
of property by the higher income spouse. See, e.g., id. 
 66. See, e.g., J. Thomas Oldham, Lessons from Jerry Hall v. Mick Jagger Regarding U.S. Regulation 
of Heterosexual Cohabitants or, Can’t Get No Satisfaction, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1409, 1433 (2001) 
(“I have proposed that the current United States approach should be changed, at least for those 
cohabitation relationships of some duration where a partner has suffered career damage due to the 
relationship, either by being a primary caretaker for a common child or for some other reason.”). 
 67. See generally AM. L. INST., Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution § 6.03 (2002); see also 
Lynn D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family: A Critique of the American Law Institute’s “Domestic 
Partners” Proposal, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2001). 
 68. Oldham, supra note 66, at 1420. 
 69. Wardle, supra note 67, at 1195. 
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The ALI proposal moved away from Marvin’s implied and explicit 
contract approach, instead establishing a series of factors to 
determine whether two cohabitants were domestic partners.70 If so, 
remedies would apply to their separation.71 When cohabitants wanted 
to opt out of the commitment, they would do so by written 
agreement.72 However, the ALI was not persuasive with the states, 
which retain the Marvin/Hewitt dichotomy and focus on contractual 
rights for cohabitants as the main remedy.73 
B.   Recent Developments on Cohabitation 
While much of the cohabitation legal framework dates back to the 
1970s, there have been several cases in recent years addressing 
cohabitants’ rights in the United States. First, the Illinois Supreme 
Court declined an opportunity to overturn Hewitt and start enforcing 
property rights between cohabitants.74 A second development was a 
New Jersey legislative change that became effective in 2010, 
requiring cohabitation agreements to be in writing and prompting 
several cases.75 Third, a court in Hawaii had a case of first impression 
on whether premarital contributions are considered in dividing a 
marital estate.76 Finally, Vermont expressed the need to formulate 
more flexible remedies in acknowledgement of the rise of 
cohabitation.77 These are some of the recent major developments on 
cohabitation, with most of the remaining states maintaining the status 
quo or offering clarification on previous holdings.78 
                                                                                                                 
 70. AM. L. INST., supra note 67, § 6.03. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation of Spousal 
Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1583 (2009). 
 73. Oldham, supra note 66, at 1423, 1425. 
 74. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 69 N.E.3d 834, 860 (Ill. 2016); see also infra Part I.B. 
 75. Susan K. Livio, Palimony Claims Only Enforceable with Written Agreement Under New Law 
Signed by Gov. Corzine, NJ.COM (Jan. 19, 2010), 
https://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/01/gov_corzine_signs_bill_that_ch.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q9PN-DQR8]. 
 76. Collins v. Wassell, 323 P.3d 1216, 1225 (Haw. 2014). 
 77. Wynkoop v. Stratthaus, 136 A.3d 1180, 1194 (Vt. 2016). 
 78. Bowman, supra note 64, at 126. 
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Most notably in the last few years, a challenge to Hewitt arose in 
Illinois in 2015. In Blumenthal v. Brewer, the Illinois Court of 
Appeals held that a woman could bring claims against her former 
partner for property they owned together.79 The Illinois Supreme 
Court did not uphold this decision.80 
In Brewer, Jane Blumenthal and Eileen Brewer became same-sex 
domestic partners in the early 1980s.81 Despite the absence of same-
sex marriage in Illinois, the couple exchanged rings and presented 
themselves as a committed lifelong couple.82 
For almost three decades, Blumenthal and Brewer built a life 
together, combined their finances, and raised three children.83 While 
Blumenthal focused on providing financial support for the family, 
Brewer spent a substantial amount of time caring for their children 
and home.84 After the relationship ended, Blumenthal sought 
partition of the property she owned with Brewer during their 
relationship.85 Brewer counterclaimed for various common law 
remedies, including sole title to the home and an interest in 
Blumenthal’s ownership share in a medical group.86 The 
counterclaim aimed for the couple’s overall assets to be equalized at 
the end of the cohabitation.87 The Illinois Court of Appeals held that 
the state’s “public policy of prohibiting unmarried domestic partners 
from bringing common-law claims against one another no longer 
exists” and that Brewer may continue with her claims regarding the 
property they acquired during the relationship.88 
The Illinois Supreme Court heard the appeal, but declined to 
overrule Hewitt. The court determined that cohabitants cannot bring 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 24 N.E.3d 168, 183 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). 
 80. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 69 N.E.3d 834, 860 (Ill. 2016). 
 81. Id. at 840. 
 82. Id. at 852. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 839. 
 86. Blumenthal, 69 N.E.3d at 839. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 840. 
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property claims,89 noting that any changes to this approach should 
come from the state legislature.90 
In sum, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to overrule Hewitt 
when provided the opportunity in recent years, denying cohabitants 
contract and property rights. This decision illustrates the continued 
lack of legal developments on cohabitation in the United States 
despite demographic shifts toward cohabitation.91 However, 
Obergefell v. Hodges may have mooted a major reason for cohabitant 
protection, which was to protect same-sex couples unable to marry.92 
Nonetheless, other reasons remain for cohabitation contracts, such as 
protecting the vulnerable cohabitant. 
Meanwhile, a legislative change prompted new case law in New 
Jersey. In January 2010, the New Jersey legislature amended the 
palimony statute governing support claims between separated 
cohabitants to require written agreements.93 Following this change, 
separated cohabitants brought two noteworthy cases. In the first case 
in 2014, the court determined that New Jersey Statutes § 25:1-5 did 
not apply retroactively to oral palimony agreements made prior to 
January 2010.94 Additionally, the court stated that this statutory 
change superseded the holdings in In re Estate of Roccamonte and 
Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, both of which upheld oral cohabitant 
agreements.95 Subsequently, in the unpublished federal case of Sook 
Hee Lee v. Kim, the appellant made a § 1983 claim challenging the 
validity of the New Jersey statute.96 However, this challenge failed 
and was dismissed due to the appellant’s failure to state a claim for 
violation of her First Amendment privacy rights, her Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection rights, or her Fourteenth Amendment 
privacy rights relating to familial matters.97 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Id. at 859. 
 90. Id. at 858. 
 91. See id. at 853. 
 92. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2642 (2015). 
 93. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:1-5 (2010). 
 94. Maeker v. Ross, 99 A.3d 795, 805 (N.J. 2014). 
 95. Id.; see also In re Estate of Roccamonte, 808 A.2d 838, 843 (N.J. 2002); Kozlowski v. 
Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902, 906 (N.J. 1979). 
 96. Lee v. Kim, 654 F. App’x 64, 66 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 97. Id. at 69. 
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Many other cases on cohabitation in recent years focused on the 
contractual nature of cohabitation.98 Indeed, some courts distinguish 
property divisions based on cohabitation and those based on 
principles regarding shared property.99 This may be a solution for 
some cohabitants in states that are reluctant to enforce contracts 
based on companionship.100 
For example, in 2016, the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated 
that the division of property between cohabitants was not a divorce-
like remedy, but rather a division of property based on equitable 
determination of petitioner’s rights in two parcels of real property.101 
In another case, the Vermont Supreme Court focused on the fact 
that the two parties were colessees even though they were also 
unmarried cohabitants.102 In this case, the court crafted a somewhat 
flexible remedy for the plaintiff cohabitant in the context of the 
parties’ alleged agreement for the plaintiff to quit her job and serve as 
the general contractor for the construction of the couple’s property 
while the defendant supported them both through his income.103 The 
court stated that there is a need for flexible remedies in equity to 
meet modern and more complex circumstances.104 
Similarly, contract consideration was at the essence of Dooner v. 
Yuen, which involved the Minnesota palimony statute and the 
division of real property.105 This case addressed a woman’s 
                                                                                                                 
 98. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 MD. L. REV. 55, 121 (2016) (“Nonmarriage, 
as a new legal status, could be conceptualized as the ability to craft custom arrangements, even if they 
are seemingly unequal. That is, marriage is a fixed institution premised on equality with a set of clear 
rules, while nonmarriage implies the freedom to contract on a continuum of terms. Because the law does 
not impose those terms, greater autonomy is possible, but formal equality between parents is not 
mandated and may not be appropriate. The law can only routinize these relationships if it acknowledges 
the reasons parents choose non-marriage over marriage, and incorporates these differences into both 
financial and custody decisionmaking.”). 
 99. See infra notes 101–10. 
 100. See infra notes 111–14. 
 101. Brooks v. Allen, 137 A.3d 404, 410 (N.H. 2016). The court previously held that until the 
legislature directs differently, the court would not recognize an implied contract based on homemaking 
services. Tapley v. Tapley, 449 A.2d 1218, 1219 (N.H. 1982). 
 102. Wynkoop v. Stratthaus, 136 A.3d 1180, 1187 (Vt. 2016). 
 103. Id. at 1190. 
 104. Id. at 1188. 
  105   Dooner v. Yuen, Civ. No. 16–1939 (RHK/SER), 2016 WL 6080814, at *2 (D. Minn. Oct. 17, 
2016). The statute at issue was MINN. STAT. § 513.075 (2017). 
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counterclaim to half the proceeds from the sale of her cohabitant’s 
real property.106 She relied on a signed, handwritten document 
describing the cohabitants’ mutual financial plans and agreements.107 
However, the court found no consideration for the contract.108 Her 
additional claims for relief under promissory estoppel and unjust 
enrichment also failed.109 Unlike in other cases, the fact that the item 
in dispute was real property did not help her.110 
Conversely, Nevada has allowed both express and implied 
contracts based on companionship and other factors, thus eliminating 
the need to base the division upon the separate laws of real 
property.111 In the recent unpublished case of Bumb v. Young, the 
Nevada Supreme Court confirmed its position that property may be 
divided based on express or implied agreement of support in 
exchange for companionship, partnership, and business and personal 
assistance under the state’s community property by analogy 
doctrine.112 
Alaska also allows for division based on express or implied intent. 
The recent case of Boulds v. Nielsen provides guidance for lower 
courts when determining express or implied intent regarding property 
division.113 In this case, the court allowed the division of a pension 
between two cohabitants upon dissolution of their relationship based 
on their intent.114 
Another set of circumstances relating to cohabitation arises when 
the cohabitants marry and then divorce. Courts must then determine 
how they should divide property acquired prior to the marriage upon 
divorce. Two recent cases from Hawaii clarify the term “premarital 
                                                                                                                 
 106.  Id. at *1. 
 107. Id. 
 108.  Id. at *2. 
 109. Id. at *3. 
 110. Dooner, 2016 WL 6080814 at *2–3. 
 111.  Bumb v. Young, No. 63825, 2015 WL 4642594, at *1 (Nev. Aug. 4, 2015). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Boulds v. Nielsen, 323 P.3d 58, 113 (Alaska 2014). 
 114. Id. See also Tomal v. Anderson, Supreme Court Nos. S-16720/16760, 2018 WL 4170879, at *4 
n.15 (Alaska Aug. 31, 2018) (clarifying that when considering property after the end of a domestic 
partnership, “the correct rule is that what the parties intended is a question of fact, and the legal 
significance of that intent is a question of law”). 
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economic partnership.”115 First, in Collins v. Wassell, as a matter of 
first impression, the court held that premarital contributions are to be 
considered when dividing the marital estate.116 Further clarification 
came from Hamilton v. Hamilton, where the court discussed the 
factors to be considered in determining whether the parties intended 
to form a premarital economic partnership.117 These considerations 
include joint acts of a financial nature, duration of cohabitation, 
whether and the extent to which finances are commingled, and 
economic and noneconomic contributions to the household for the 
couple’s mutual benefit.118 
New Jersey also recently heard a case regarding cohabitants who 
later married and divorced. In Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, the parties 
sought determination of whether a wife was entitled to a portion of a 
husband’s work bonus in the divorce.119 The court determined that 
the wife was entitled to equitable distribution of the portion of the 
bonus earned during their fourteen-month marriage, but not the 
portion of the bonus that was earned during their eight-year 
cohabitation.120 However, the court held that under the theory of 
unjust enrichment, the wife was able to recover a portion of the 
bonus that was earned during their cohabitation period.121 
The federal income tax code continues to inadvertently encourage 
cohabitation in some circumstances. This is due to the marriage 
penalty resulting from some income tax brackets that do not double 
upon marriage and phase-outs of certain tax benefits whose 
thresholds are not double those of single filers.122 One study has 
shown that if they married, more cohabiting couples would be 
penalized by the marriage penalty in tax law than would receive the 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 378 P.3d 901, 915 (Haw. 2016); Collins v. Wassell, 323 P.3d 1216, 1218 
n.1 (Haw. 2014). 
 116. Collins, 323 P.3d at 1226. 
 117. Hamilton, 378 P.3d at 915. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 151 A.3d 545, 548 (N.J. 2016). 
 120. Id. at 556. 
 121. Id. at 559. 
 122. See, e.g., Christine D. Allie, Negating the Cost of “I Do”: Ending the United States Tax Code’s 
Family Penalty Through Permissive Joint Filing, 78 LA. L. REV. 499, 506 (2018). 
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marriage bonus.123 Republicans and Democrats both recognize the 
problem with the marriage penalty,124 but it has persisted because of 
the elusiveness of comprehensive solutions.125 
In sum, cohabitation continues to be separate and legally distinct 
from marriage in the United States. In cohabitation, there are fewer 
rights and obligations than in marriage.126 Cohabitants’ contract 
rights are the primary way to protect cohabitants. Among the states 
that recognize cohabitation contracts, there are variations regarding 
whether the contract must be written or oral, as well as express or 
implied. 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Emily Y. Lin & Patricia K. Tong, Marriage and Taxes: What Can We Learn from Tax Returns 
Filed by Cohabiting Couples?, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 807, 809 (2012) (noting that “48 percent of cohabiting 
couples . . . would have a tax increase if they were married and filed jointly”); see also Mitchell L. 
Engler & Edward D. Stein, Not Too Separate or Unequal: Marriage Penalty Relief After Obergefell, 91 
WASH. L. REV. 1073, 1075 (2016) (“While same-sex couples may now marry throughout the United 
States, the joint return system imposes a significant cost on many of them. As a result, some such 
couples may decide to cohabitate in lieu of marriage or to opt for a civil union, domestic partnership, or 
other marriage-like relationship. This is because many same-sex couples are relatively even earners.”). 
 124. Fa’Asamala v. Comm’r, No. 9220–97 (T.C. filed Apr. 9, 1998) (“Additionally, petitioners’ 
concern about the ‘marriage penalty’ is currently a matter which is being considered by members of 
Congress.”) (citing Marriage Tax Elimination Act, H.R. 2456, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); Marriage Penalty 
Relief Act, H.R. 2593, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997)); see also Calmes v. U.S., 926 F. Supp. 582, 593 (N.D. 
Tex. 1996) (“The Court believes that this is a classic example of the right hand not knowing (or caring) 
what the left hand is doing. The President and Congress extol the virtues of marriage and the family, 
debate per-child tax credits and laud the demise of the marriage-penalty present in the tax code, while 
the agency itself attempts to have its Texas community property cake and eat it too.”); Lawrence 
Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1, 1–2 
(2000) (noting that although proposed bills in the late 1990s and early 2000s offered such relief, the 
President them for different reasons). 
 125. Lawrence Zelenak, For Better and Worse: The Differing Income Tax Treatments of Marriage at 
Different Income Levels, 93 N.C. L. REV. 783, 784 (2015) (“As a matter of simple arithmetic, it is 
impossible for a tax system to feature simultaneously (1) progressive marginal tax rates, (2) joint filing 
by married couples (in the service of producing equal taxes on equal-income married couples), and (3) 
marriage neutrality (that is, no tax marriage penalties or bonuses). If the legislature insists on the first 
two features, as Congress has for many decades, then the third desideratum is 
unachievable . . . . Although a legislature committed to the first two goals must violate marriage 
neutrality, the legislature has a great deal of freedom to determine whether, and to what extent, to skew 
the neutrality violations toward either marriage penalties or marriage bonuses.”). Id. at 792 (“When 
cohabitation was not a socially available counterfactual to marriage, neither marriage penalties nor 
bonuses were likely to have much visceral impact.”). 
 126. See, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the Right to Nonmarriage, 97 B.U. L. 
REV. 425, 429–30 (2017) (“Regardless of how long they have been living together or how financially 
independent they are, unmarried partners typically cannot sue for wrongful death. Unmarried partners 
are not entitled to spousal social security benefits in the event of the disability of one of them. 
Individuals who are in mutually dependent but unmarried relationships are not entitled to take leave 
under the Family and Medical Leave Act to care for each other. In many states, an unmarried partner 
who agrees to have a child through assisted reproduction is a legal stranger to the resulting child.”). 
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Courts appear to be deferring to state legislatures for further 
guidance. As cohabitation increases, however, some courts may be 
expanding cohabitants’ rights by focusing on existing real property 
laws or equitable principles. 
II.  Cohabitation Developments in Poland 
Cohabitation remains outside the scope of Poland’s family and 
guardianship code,127 although it is a form of family for many people, 
especially when it spans several years and produces children. 
Although, Polish legislation does not recognize cohabitation, it is 
legal.128 Some scholars have argued for the recognition of 
cohabitation and for the regulation of at least some of its aspects.129 
Without legislative regulation on cohabitation, the key guidance 
for cohabitants is judicial.130 Different legal approaches are used 
when a cohabitation ends and there is a property dispute.131 The 
definition of cohabitation is controversial, and it is not clear whether 
it includes same-sex couples,132 although recently it has included 
both same- and opposite-sex couples.133 
At the beginning of the relationship, cohabitants seldom consider 
issues related to property.134 Only the most proactive cohabitants 
attempt to govern their property relationship by entering into an 
agreement, which becomes important when the cohabitation ends and 
                                                                                                                 
 127. See Anna Stępień-Sporek et al., Some Remarks on Cohabitation in Poland, THE INT’L SURV. OF 
FAM. L. 247, 251 (2015). 
 128. Id. at 247. 
 129. Mirosław Nazar, Cywilnoprawne Zagadnienia Konkubinatu de lege Ferenda, 12 PAŃSTWO I 
PRAWO 103, 103–13 (1989). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Seweryn Szer, Konkubinat, 13 STUDIA CYWILISTYCZNE 358 (1969). 
 132. Brunon Paul, Koncepcja Rozliczeń Majątkowych Między Konkubentami, 3 PRZEGLĄD SĄDOWY 
16 (2003) [hereinafter Koncepcja]; see also Marek Stus, Instytucjonalizacja Związków Partnerskich i 
Małżeństw Homoseksualnych w Ustawodawstwie Państw Europejskich, 5 PAŃSTWO I PRAWO 74 (2005); 
Boleslaw Banaszkiewicz, Problem Konstytucjonalnej Oceny Instytucjonalizacji Związków 
Homoseksualnych, 2 KWARTALNIK PRAWA PRYWATNEGO 359 (2004). 
 133. Filip Hartwich, Konkubinat—Dylematy Prawne, 3-4 PALESTRA 57, 57–71 (2007). 
 134. See generally Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky Expectations: Responses to Persistent Over-
Optimism in Marriage, Employment Contracts, and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733, 
757–61 (2009). 
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the property acquired during the relationship becomes the subject of 
dispute.135 
Indeed, in the context of cohabitation, the decision to acquire 
property is often accompanied by emotion instead of logic. Although 
this is similar to married couples, the law of community 
propertythe default marital property system in Polandprotects 
the rights of spouses if they avail themselves of it.136 It is well-
established, however, that these rules for married couples do not 
apply to cohabitants because cohabitation is not analogous to 
marriage, as confirmed in the resolution of the Polish Supreme Court 
of July 2, 1955 (case no. II CO 7/ 55).137 The rules on community 
property between spouses should therefore not be used for 
cohabitants.138 Instead, the judge hearing the cohabitants’ case must 
apply general principles of law.139 
Nonetheless, it is not possible to completely ignore the nature of 
the union of cohabitants. Their intimate relationship affects their 
decisions to some extent, and their behavior can be very close to 
marital. These are some of the justifications for the legal protection 
of cohabitants, especially for the more vulnerable party of the 
relationship.140 Indeed, there have been several legal protections 
applied to cohabitants in recent years.141 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Id. 
 136. If spouses have entered into a marital property agreement, their situation may not differ from 
cohabitants, but then they need to make a deliberate choice and consider their decision. See Margaret 
Ryznar & Anna Stepień-Sporek, To Have and to Hold, for Richer or Richer: Premarital Agreements in 
the Comparative Context, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 27, 53 (2009). 
 137. See also, e.g., Sądu Najwyższego [Supreme Court of Poland], June 27, 1996, III CZP 70/96 
(OSNC 1996/11/145, LEX nr 25824); Sądu Najwyższego [Supreme Court of Poland], May 16, 2000, IV 
CKN 32/00 (OSN 2000/12/222, LEX nr 43414). 
 138. Sądu Apelacyjnego w Krakowie [Court of Appeals in Kraków], April 29, 2014, I ACa 527/13 
(LEX nr 1602935). 
 139. See infra Part II. 
 140. Emily Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice: Restitution Between Cohabitants, 77 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 711, 720 (2006) (noting a few jurisdictions that protect cohabitants in relationships similar to 
marriage). 
 141. See infra Part II. 
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A.   The Nature of the Legal Actions of Cohabitants 
In addition to the emotional factor in property transfers between 
cohabitants, many of these transfers are made informally and without 
consideration of whether the property is common property or 
separate property.142 Yet, the classification of property becomes 
essential at the end of the cohabitation or in the event of a conflict 
between the cohabitants. 
The constructive element of the legal action is the intent of the 
party.143 In settling property disputes between cohabitants, it is 
necessary to separate acts of kindness from those that have legal 
consequences.144 In practice, this is extremely difficult, and the 
context of the action should be examined, as it may not be detached 
from the particular emotional situation that arises between 
cohabitants. 
A kind act done by one cohabitant for the other prevents the 
application of the unjust enrichment doctrine.145 As a consequence, 
there is no obligation to return such a donation.146 Many actions 
during a cohabitation should be treated as kind acts because the intent 
of the party was steered toward gratuitous actions at the time. 
A cohabitation in itself does not prevent the existence of a 
contractual relationship between the cohabitants.147 Similarly, marital 
status does not affect the capacity of the spouses to enter into 
contracts between themselves, including civil partnerships and 
contractual transfers of property.148 This does not mean, however, 
that cohabitation contracts can be viewed in the same way as 
contracts between unrelated individuals. However, if the court 
establishes that the cohabitants have entered into a contract, the rules 
of that contract should apply. Therefore, the first step of the court 
                                                                                                                 
 142. Brunon Paul, Problemy Rozliczeń Majątkowych Między Konkubentami, 8 MONITOR PRAWNICZY 
357 (2002) [hereinafter Problemy]. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 357. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 357 
 148. Problemy, supra note 142, at 358. 
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should be to examine whether there are any contracts between the 
cohabitants. 
Economic and legal interests should be taken into account when 
considering the actions of cohabitants. Homemaking is an example—
as a general rule, such duties are fulfilled according to mutual 
agreements, are free of charge, and neither partner claims payment. 
This changes at the end of a cohabitation, when one partner may 
make claims for compensation. Still, the determinative factor is the 
intent of the cohabitants. 
B.   The Legal Classification of Actions Performed Between 
Cohabitants 
Legal acts by cohabitants for each other can be classified as 
donations,149 justified by the fact that there are emotional bonds 
between them that make them willing to perform activities free of 
charge.150 However, such categorizations should not be abused 
because even in marital relationships, not all legal acts between 
spouses are of a gratuitous nature.151 For example, in the division of 
common property upon the termination of a marriage, one spouse can 
successfully seek remuneration for work done in the other spouse’s 
business.152 
When classifying the actions of cohabitants, it is important to 
consider the moment of their completion, which usually results in the 
recognition that a donation took place. Admittedly, after many years, 
cohabitants may be inclined to claim that their actions were of a 
different character than a donation, but the court should be cautious. 
Furthermore, the court cannot ignore the changes in the moral 
assessment of both cohabitation and the relevant property transfers in 
the last few decades.153 
                                                                                                                 
 149. Szer, supra note 131, at 360. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Compare the remarks made in 1969 by Seweryn Szer in Szer, supra note 131, at 361–62. 
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A possible solution is to revoke the donation due to the “blatant 
ingratitude of the beneficiary.”154 However, it is necessary to 
remember the time limit for revoking a donation in Art. 899 § 3 of 
the Civil Code.155 Also, it is important to consider the meaning of 
blatant ingratitude.156 The termination of a cohabitation is not 
necessarily considered blatant ingratitude because a characteristic of 
cohabitation is that either cohabitant can terminate it at any time for 
no particular reason.157 
The extent to which society’s moral norms must be violated to 
constitute blatant ingratitude of the beneficiary is difficult to 
determine in a general way.158 It should be noted that even in 
marriage: 
. . . [V]iolation of marital obligations referred to in Art. 23 
k.r.o., i.e. mutual assistance and fidelity, and cooperation 
for the good of the family, which spouses have established, 
cannot be the basis for revoking of donation. It is important 
for the beneficiary to commit a gross ingratitude to the 
spouse, which is the subject of a court investigation, taking 
into account the circumstances of the case.159 
Thus, blatant ingratitude cannot just be the termination of the 
cohabitation. It must be something more, such as ending the 
relationship in a very difficult time for the cohabitant like during an 
illness. If the criteria were easier, then the revocation of a donation 
could be a sanction for ending the cohabitation.160 
                                                                                                                 
 154. KODEKS CYWILNY (CIVIL CODE), Art. 898, § 1 (“A donor may revoke a donation even if already 
made if the donee manifests gross ingratitude towards him.”). 
 155. Id. at Art. 899, § 3 (“A donation cannot be revoked after one year has passed from the day on 
which the person entitled to revoke it learns of the donee’s ingratitude.”). 
 156. ANDRZEJ SZLĘZAK, STOSUNKI MAJĄTKOWE MIĘDZY KONKUBENTAMI: ZAGADNIENIA 
WYBRANE 57 (1992). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Appeal Court Łódź, Oct. 25, 2016, I Aca 485/16, LEX No. 2200342 (Pol.). 
 159. Id. 
 160. SZLĘZAK, supra note 156, at 57. 
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C.   Partnership 
The provisions on civil partnership, which is characterized by a 
lack of formalism, may be helpful in settling cohabitants’ legal 
actions.161 These provisions can be applied to implicit contracts 
between cohabitants,162 although the starting point would have to be 
that the cohabitants entered into this type of contract.163 If it is not 
possible to assume that there was a contract between cohabitants, 
then the other rules regarding civil partnership might be applicable. If 
it is possible to apply the provisions regarding civil partnership to 
cohabitants, one can settle contributions by the services and property 
of the partners. 
However, the entire regulation on civil partnership cannot be 
applied to cohabitation.164 Although it is possible to pursue a 
common economic goal, it is usually the personal relationship of the 
cohabitants that is most significant. Regarding cohabitants, as in the 
case of spouses, there are no objections to the joint implementation of 
certain undertakings. In this case, recourse to the provisions on the 
civil law partnership is justified. However, the application of the civil 
partnership regulation cannot go too far, and it is indispensable in 
that case to distinguish property relations that are similar to 
relationships in civil partnerships. Other relationships remain outside 
of these rules. 
D.   Unjust Enrichment 
Many courts use the provisions on unjust enrichment, namely the 
regulation on undue performance, to settle the cohabitants’ disputes 
regarding property.165 Unjust enrichment can apply, for example, in 
                                                                                                                 
 161. Tomasz Jasiakiewicz, Rozliczenia Majątkowe Pomiędzy Osobami tej Samej płci Pozostającymi w 
Związku Faktycznym i Prowadzącymi Wspólnie Działalność Gospodarczą, 2 GLOSA 122, 122–27 
(2010). 
 162. Problemy, supra note 142, at 359. 
 163. See Koncepcja, supra note 132, at 24–27. 
 164. Problemy, supra note 142, at 359. 
 165. Andrzej Szlezak, Cohabitation Without Marriage in Poland, 5 INT’L J. OF LAW, POLICY & THE 
FAMILY 1, 8-9 (1991). 
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cases of services provided in a common household.166 However, this 
is controversial and should be used as a last resort.167 
Cohabitants provide services for various reasons resulting from 
their special relationship, including a belief that they are obliged to 
pay maintenance or that it will guarantee a long-lasting relationship, 
which is the most common situation and the simplest to prove. The 
causal conditions of causa data causa non secuta are fulfilled 
because the purpose of the union cannot be attained. 
The advantage to relying on unjust enrichment is that the 
cohabitant can demand reimbursement for services provided.168 The 
drawback is that, according to Art. 411(2) of the Civil Code, the 
cohabitant cannot demand the return of services if the performance of 
the services satisfies the principles of community life.169 It is 
necessary to closely examine all of the circumstances of the 
particular case because not all benefits between cohabitants are due 
to the principles of social coexistence.170 
E.   Co-ownership 
The mere existence of a cohabitation does not preclude co-
ownership.171 A co-ownership contract can be sought by the buyers 
of a property with the buyers acquiring appropriate rights to the 
property.172 
There are two relevant presumptions concerning possession: the 
presumption of owner-like possession in Art. 339 of the Code and the 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Id. See also William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of 
Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1930 (2012) (“[B]y providing 
household services or support for a partner’s career or business, the claiming partner has established an 
equitable basis for recovering the value of her or his services.”). 
 167. Marek Sobczyk, Rozliczenia Między Stronami Związków Partnerskich na Podstawie Przepisów o 
Bezpodstawnym Wzbogaceniu, 24 KWARTALNIK PRAWA PRYWATNEGO 381, 381 (2015). 
 168. KODEKS CYWILNY (CIVIL CODE), Art. 405. 
 169. Id. at Art. 411(2) (“The return of a performance cannot be demanded . . . if the performance 
satisfies the principles of community life”). 
 170. Problemy, supra note 142, at 360. 
 171. Polish Supreme Court, June 27, 1996, OSNC 1996, poz. 145 (1996); see also Appeal Court in 
Bialystok, June 12, 2014, I Aca 601/13 (2014). 
 172. Handbook for Real Estate Transactions, DELOITTE 138 (2017), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Legal/dttl-legal-deloitte-legal-
handbook-for-real-estate-transactions.pdf [https://perma.cc/BXX6-MLXF]. 
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compliance with the law of possession in Art. 341 of the Code.173 
The mere demonstration of possession by both cohabitants could 
trigger these presumptions and lead to the conclusion that they are 
co-owners of certain property.174 
These presumptions are particularly important with regard to 
movables. The transfer of real estate can be made only in notarial 
deed according to Art. 158 of the Civil Code, and the notary public is 
obliged to ask cohabitants how they want to establish ownership of 
the acquired property.175 
F.   Supplementary Claims 
In addition to the protections for property co-owners, a former 
cohabitant is entitled to the claims referred to in Arts. 224–31 of the 
Civil Code when the cohabitant was still using the property after the 
termination of the cohabitation.176 The earlier personal relationship of 
the former cohabitants does not matter for this protection. 
It is also worth mentioning the possibility of using the protection 
provided by Art. 231 § 1 of the Civil Code, which often applies when 
one of the cohabitants has built on the real estate of the other 
cohabitant.177 Court decisions have established that such claims can 
also be used by the person who possesses the land with its owner, 
with the co-possessor able to request that the ownership of the 
property be transferred to him or her. Indeed, it cannot be overlooked 
that, as a rule, a cohabitant at least implicitly has agreed to the use of 
the property by a cohabitant. 
It is problematic in this case if the cohabitant acts in good faith. 
Usually, cohabitants know their financial situation. A liberal 
interpretation of the doctrine assumes that if the owner of the 
property did not provide the grounds for accepting that the co-owner 
of the property is the owner, then the co-owner should be regarded as 
acting in bad faith. According to this reasoning, good faith is 
                                                                                                                 
 173. KODEKS CYWILNY (CIVIL CODE), Arts. 339, 341. 
 174. Szlezak, supra note 165, at 9. 
 175. KODEKS CYWILNY (CIVIL CODE), Art. 158. 
 176. Id. at Arts. 224–31. 
 177. Id. at Art. 231 § 1. 
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attributed to a cohabitant when the owner of the property creates a 
situation in which it might appear that the partner has a legal right to 
act. 
In this doctrine, there is also a view referring to the principles of 
social coexistence, in which the possessor, in bad faith, should be 
treated as a holder who is formally in good faith. It is important, at 
this point, to thoroughly investigate the circumstances of the case and 
whether there is a particular degree of trust between the parties to the 
relationship which may justify a departure from the need to meet the 
formal requirements of good faith. 
G.   Torts 
An injury to a partner’s property or shared property will result in 
liability for tort damages if the injury meets the general elements of a 
tort.178 However, liability is excluded for certain damages caused by 
a cohabitant’s negligence.179 This is justified by the fact that those 
living in a common household should be aware of certain 
unfavorable changes in their property resulting from the mistakes and 
actions of their partners. 
The separation of cohabitants does not give rise to liability for 
damages.180 The essence of a cohabitation is that it can be ended at 
any time, so even a unilateral decision to leave this relationship 
cannot be regarded as contrary to the principles of social coexistence. 
H.   Burden of Proof 
Important in settling disputes between cohabitants may be proving 
certain circumstances.181 However, legal actions do not always 
proceed according to proper form given the personal relationship 
between the cohabitants. In this context, the question is whether the 
                                                                                                                 
 178. Id. at Art. 415. 
 179. Id. at Art. 440. 
 180. Problemy, supra note 142, at 361. 
 181. USTAWA Z DNIA 17 LISTOPADA 1964 R. KODEKS POSTĘPOWANIA CYWILNEGO [CIVIL 
PROCEDURE CODE], tit. 7, ch. 2, art. 441, translated at https://www.global-
regulation.com/translation/poland/7049655/act-of-17-november-1964%252c-the-code-of-civil-
procedure.html [https://perma.cc/YY4M-J5Y2]. 
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evidence of the witnesses or the hearings of the parties is admissible 
as the only means of evidence available in such cases.182 The Civil 
Procedure Code may, in principle, prevent certain circumstances 
from being demonstrated.183 
I.   Limitation Period for Claims 
Limitation periods are not unique to cohabitants, although their 
relationship may be similar to that of spouses.184 With regard to the 
latter, the limitation period does not begin for the duration of the 
marriage.185 This is due to the existence of a special, personal 
relationship between the spouses and, in the course of the spousal 
cohabitation, it is possible to refrain from seeking redress. 
Similarities between cohabitation and marriage could lead to the 
application of provisions limiting the limitation period to 
cohabitation by analogy. Nonetheless, these two relationships are 
fundamentally different, and the case law does not extend the rules of 
settlement between spouses to cohabitants.186 
In disputes between cohabitants, protection can be justified on the 
basis of the institution of abuse of rights. If the claimant has lodged a 
claim after the expiration of the limitation period, the limitation of 
the claim may be assessed in the context of compliance with the 
principles of social coexistence.187 Another possible solution in this 
case is to argue that the claims of the cohabitants become due or that 
the time of the dissolution of the relationship may be the earliest time 
to investigate. From this point on, the limitation period should start 
its course. However, this position is not enough to justify de lege 
lata.188 
                                                                                                                 
 182. KODEKS CYWILNY (CIVIL CODE), Art. 74, § 1; Arts. 246–47. 
 183. USTAWA Z DNIA 17 LISTOPADA 1964 R. KODEKS POSTĘPOWANIA CYWILNEGO [CODE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE], tit. 7, ch. 2, art. 441. 
 184. Koncepcja, supra note 132, at 40. 
 185. KODEKS CYWILNY (CIVIL CODE), Art. 121, § 3. 
 186. The resolution of the Supreme Court of 8th August 1986, III CZP 45/86, OSNC 1987, position 
95. 
 187. See supra text accompanying note 170. 
 188. MIROSŁAW NAZAR, ROZLICZENIA MAJĄTKOWE KONKUBENTÓW 200 (1993); SZLĘZAK, supra 
note 156, at 72. 
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III.   A Comparative Analysis 
The legal developments on cohabitation in the United States and 
Poland have slowed in recent years.189 In the United States, the 
Hewitt case from Illinois established the minority approach of 
American courts to cohabitation, which is to not enforce cohabitation 
contracts on public policy grounds.190 In 2016, the Illinois Supreme 
Court declined to overrule Hewitt despite the opportunity to do so.191 
Although there have been several additional cohabitation cases in 
recent years across the country, major doctrinal strides have been 
limited.192 
In Poland, there are new court decisions regarding cohabitation, 
but they are similarly limited.193 Indeed, the question remains among 
Polish lawmakers and judges whether a legal response to this social 
phenomenon is necessary. Although the number of cohabitations is 
increasing, the pro-family policy of the law continues to aim to 
protect marriage as a basic structure of family. The demographic 
trends on cohabitation in Poland, however, are similar to those in 
other European countries and the United States in that they are 
increasing.194 
Cohabitation contracts setting the terms of a separation remain the 
primary way that cohabitants can protect themselves.195 However, 
                                                                                                                 
 189. This has not historically been true. As illustrated by the development of the United States law on 
cohabitation (and, in particular, on contract enforcement between cohabitants), there have been spurts of 
legal development on the topic. See supra Part I. As Professor Mary Ann Glendon wrote in 1989, many 
countries had “a progressive withdrawal of official regulation of marriage formation, dissolution, and 
the conduct of family life” and “increased regulation of the economic and child-related consequences of 
formal or informal cohabitation.” MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: 
STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 2 (1989). 
 190. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (Ill. 1979). 
 191. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 69 N.E.3d 834, 853 (Ill. 2016); see also supra Part I.B. 
 192. See supra Part I.B. 
 193. See supra Part II. 
 194. See supra Introduction. 
 195. Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of Cohabitant 
Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 815 (2005). Today still, “[i]n the United States . . . unmarried 
cohabitants have no obligations to each other unless they have contracted to assume such obligations.” 
Id.; see also Erez Aloni, The Puzzle of Family Law Pluralism, 39 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 317, 317 
(2016) (“As . . . scrutiny of prenuptial and cohabitation agreements reveals, neoclassical contract theory 
is slowly taking over family law.”). 
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this is only an effective method if courts recognize and enforce such 
contracts.196 Furthermore, cohabitants must know about this option to 
enter into such contracts. Thus, it is important to promote the idea of 
contractual regulation of property relationships between cohabitants, 
especially if the state legislature is silent on the issues. 
In both the United States and Poland, such contracts are not 
currently popular and instead general legal principles apply at the end 
of the cohabitation.197 However, this may not be the best solution 
because the general rules are universal and do not take into account 
the larger context of the behavior of cohabitants who undertake 
various decisions and legal actions outside of a legal framework. 
Furthermore, the emotional underpinning of cohabitation should play 
an important role in judicial determinations. 
Legislators differ on what additional legal protections should 
extend to cohabitants.198 Trial marriages, long-term cohabitations 
with children, and older cohabitants with adult children from 
previous relationships are all different—making it difficult for 
legislators to craft one law to apply to them all. For example, a 
woman might spend a night with her boyfriend a few times per week, 
keeping a toothbrush and sock drawer at his apartment. Or, a woman 
might buy a condo with her boyfriend and share a joint bank account. 
Cohabitation scenarios, therefore, widely differ. 
Furthermore, legislators may want to protect individual 
cohabitants while not encouraging the institution of cohabitation as a 
substitute for marriage given some of the benefits of marriage and 
drawbacks of cohabitation.199 One of the major drawbacks to 
                                                                                                                 
 196. Ann Laquer Estin, Marriage and Divorce Conflicts in International Perspective, 27 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 485, 487–88 (2017). Generally speaking, “[i]n the context of global families, the case 
for allowing couples to select the law that will apply to their personal and property interests seems 
especially strong.” Id. 
 197. See infra Parts I & II. 
 198. See generally Ron Haskins & Isabel V. Sawhill, The Decline of the American Family: Can 
Anything be Done to Stop the Damage?, 667 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 8, 12 (2016). 
 199. Margaret F. Brinig, Adultery: Trust and Children, 95 TEX. L. REV. 611, 624 (2017) (reviewing 
DEBORAH L. RHODE, ADULTERY: INFIDELITY AND THE LAW (2016)). 
Marriage, as opposed to cohabitation, can be characterized by its relative 
permanence, its unconditional love, and its status as an institution (receiving of 
public and private support). In addition to . . . the numerous statutory benefits 
marriage grants, married couples gain the commitment to sexual monogamy and 
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cohabitation is the very reason that vulnerable cohabitants result: 
cohabitations are unstable.200 Legislators may also want to defer to 
certain cohabitants’ preferences not to be regulated.201 
Courts, meanwhile, have more cases regarding cohabitants each 
year, but there are still not enough decisions to provide a 
comprehensive legal framework on cohabitation.202 In addition, 
courts often use general principles of law in such cases instead of 
addressing the narrow issues relating to cohabitation in particular, 
which is not always satisfactory for building consistent law.203 
However, family policy is currently focused most on protecting the 
traditional model of family, which remains married people and their 
children.204 This is seen most recently in Obergefell v. Hodges, which 
encourages family formation through marriage.205 As a result, 
cohabitants must continue to wait for a more established legal 
response to cohabitation. 
                                                                                                                 
permanence of marriage that, in turn, promotes trust. It is that trust that catalyzes 
the many fruits of marriage because, in a word, it signifies the production of 
social capital. 
Id. 
 200. Haskins & Sawhill, supra note 198, at 12. “Nearly 40 percent of cohabiting couples who have a 
baby are no longer together by the time the child reaches age five, about three times the breakup rate for 
married couples over the same period.” Id. 
 201. Gregg Strauss, The Positive Right to Marry, 102 VA. L. REV. 1691, 1696 (2016). “Cohabitants 
do not need a basic right to legal status, because once couples can create legal duties through marriage, 
they may choose to live together without undermining one another’s liberty.” Id. 
 202. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Nonmarital Families and the Legal System’s Institutional Failures, 
50 FAM. L.Q. 247, 247 (2016) (“For all its shortcomings, family law provides an institution to help 
divorcing couples restructure their families following the end of relationships. For nonmarital families, 
not so much. Unmarried parents theoretically can go to court when they separate, but most do not. Thus, 
as a practical matter, the legal system leaves unmarried parents without an effective way to transition 
from families based on romantic relationships to families based on co-parenting.”). 
 203. Martha A. McCarthy & Joanna L. Radbord, Family Law for Same Sex Couples: Chart(er)ing the 
Course, 15 CAN. J. FAM. L. 101, 167–68 (1998). 
 204. Huntington, supra note 202, at 257. 
 205. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015). The downside of public policy’s priority of 
marriage is the lack of protections for vulnerable cohabitants. Melissa Murray, Essay, Obergefell v. 
Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1207, 1207 (2016) (“Obergefell builds the case 
for equal access to marriage on the premise that marriage is the most profound, dignified, and 
fundamental institution that individuals may enter. By comparison, alternatives to marriage, which I 
collectively term ‘nonmarriage,’ are less profound, less dignified, and less valuable. On this account, the 
rationale for marriage equality rests—perhaps ironically—on the fundamental inequality of other 
relationships and kinship forms.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
This article analyzes the recent legal developments on cohabitation 
based on a comparative analysis, focusing on the various protections 
offered to cohabitants upon separation. Such developments have 
remained few, with contract remaining the primary method of 
protecting the vulnerable party leaving a cohabitation, even though 
many cohabitants do not have a contract.206 Thus, cohabitants must 
continue relying on themselves for protection when it comes to the 
property consequences at the end of their relationship. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 206. Jeanne M. Hannah, The Law and Living Together, 7 L. TRENDS & NEWS: PRAC. AREA NEWSL. 
47, 47 (2010). 
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